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Abstract 
The increasing penetration of variable renewable energy is becoming a key challenge for the 
management of the electrical grid. Electrical Energy Storage Systems (ESS) are one of the most 
suitable solutions to increase the flexibility and resilience of the electrical system. This paper 
presents an innovative methodology for the appraisal of the investment in ESS. The methodology is 
based on the Real Option Analysis and it is able to properly consider investment risks and 
uncertainties as well as the options available for the investor. The paper assesses the value of the 
option to wait for a change in the market conditions before investing and re-evaluates the 
profitability of the investment after each step of the development of the ESS project. In order to 
exemplify relevant results, this method is applied to the UK energy market and assesses the 
technical and economic feasibility of investing in ESS operating price arbitrage and Short Term 
Operating Reserves. The results show that the implementation of the Real Option Analysis increases 
the economic performance of ESS. Nevertheless, ESS still requires limited incentives to be 
economically viable. 
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1 Introduction  
Global renewable generation increased in 2013 by 240 TWh, accounting for almost 22% of total 
power generation, and it is expected to grow by almost +45% by 2020 [1]. The increasing 
penetration of variable Renewable Energy Technology (RET) is becoming a key challenge for the 
management of the electrical grid, as a high percentage of RET requires flexible power systems to 
quickly react to the variability of supply and demand, as exemplified in [2]. Nuclear power plants are 
also critical ŝĨƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶ “ůŽĂĚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŵŽĚĞ ?because their operation costs are almost 
fixed and the daily variation of power rate would lead to early aging [3]. 
Electrical Energy Storage Systems (ESS) are one of the most promising solutions to moderate the 
effects of intermittent renewable resources and to store electricity produced by other base-load 
plants (e.g. nuclear power plants) when in not needed and to provide the necessary flexibility 
required for future smart grids [4], [5]. ESS support the creation of a reliable stream of power 
throughout the day filling the gap between demand and supply.  
In the power industry, several uncertainty factors affect the profitability of ESS, and literature (see 
section 2.3 and 2.3.2) recommends to assess the value of uncertainties through the Real Option 
Analysis (ROA), which is a valuable method in uncertain contexts [6]. This work is a further 
development of [3], and investigates the technical and economic feasibility of investing in ESS 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƉƌŝĐĞĂƌďŝƚƌĂŐĞĂŶĚ^ŚŽƌƚdĞƌŵKƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐZĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ ?^dKZ ) ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĚŽŝŶŐ “ĐƌŽƐƐĂƌďŝƚƌĂŐĞ ?[4], 
[7]. Similarly to  Reuter et al. [8], this paper calculates the level of incentives that would trigger the 
investment in ESS. In addition, the model implements three relevant real options for the investment 
appraisal: the option to wait to invest, the option to build and the options to wait to build.  The 
method is applied from the investors' point of view and uses UK data because: the availability of 
public information, the expected increase of renewable sources [9], the remarkable interest in 
further nuclear development [10].  
In summary, this work addresses the following research questions:  
x Which ESS are technically and economically suitable for the storage of several MWh? 
x Which are the risks and options of investing in ESS? 
x How ROA can be implemented for an investment appraisal in ESS? 
x What is the economic performance of ESS implementing ROA?  
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2 Literature Review  
 Overview of Energy Storage Systems  
Energy Storage refers to a three-steps process that consists of (1) withdrawing electricity from the 
grid, (2) converting it into a form that can be stored, and (3) converting it back and returning it to the 
grid when needed [11]. This process enables the storage of energy at times of either low demand, 
low generation cost or from intermittent energy sources and uses it at times of high demand, high 
market price and or when power is needed as backup.  
Akinyele and Rayudu [11] give a complete overview of ESS, updating the work of Chen et al. [12]. ESS 
have four main components: the charging unit, the storage medium, the discharging unit, and the 
control unit, and can be classified by the form of storage into four different main clusters [12]:  
1) Mechanical (Pumped Hydro Systems, Compressed Air Energy Storage..); 
2) Chemical (fuel cells, batteries..); this cluster is sometimes further divided into Chemical ESS and 
Electrochemical ESS [13]; 
3) Electrical (capacitor, super capacitors); 
4) Thermal (low temperature and high temperature storage). 
ESS can also be classified according to several other parameters, such as the quantity of energy 
stored, the rate at which energy can be absorbed, the efficiency of the ESS, their cycle life, their 
applications [14] and according to the implementation within the power grid [15]. Denholm et al. 
[16] list the different applications of ESS depending on the combination of discharge time, response 
time and benefits provided to the grid (see a description of benefits in [17]. 
Following the research of Locatelli et al. [3], this work focuses on large ESS operating price arbitrage 
and STOR. Price arbitrage is one of the most common application of large-scale ESS and refers to the 
practice of purchasing low-cost off-peak energy in order to sell it during periods of high prices. Off-
peak prices normally incur during the night, when the energy demand is lower. STOR is one of the 
services provided by UK National Grid, and it provides electricity to match demand and production. 
The minimum requirements for a power plant willing to operate STOR are [18]:  
x offer a minimum of 3MW generation; 
x have a maximum Response Time for delivery of 240 minutes, although typical contracts are for 
20 minutes or less; 
x be able to deliver the contracted MW for a continuous period of minimum 2 hours; 
x have a recovery period after provision of Reserve of not more than 1200 minutes; 
x be able to deliver at least three times per week. 
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As in Locatelli et al. [3], price arbitrage and STOR are the most relevant for the integration of large 
amount of electricity, especially from wind farms. In fact, due to the large deployment of wind 
farms, the grid is affected by balancing problems, and reserve services are required. ESS can be used 
in alternative or to complement gas turbines in order to tackle the balancing problems, to generate 
electricity when prices are high and to store it when prices are low. However, only few technologies 
meet the aforementioned requirements and the most adequate ESS for price arbitrage and STOR are 
Pumped Hydroelectric Storage (PHS) and Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES), as they both fulfil 
the above-mentioned requirements. Currently there are several PHS systems (e.g. 7.6 GW in Italy, 
7.6 GW in Germany, more than 20 GW in the US..), and two CAES systems installed in the world [19].  
  
 ^^ ?ZŝƐŬŶĂůǇƐŝƐ 
Chapman and Ward [20] assert that:  ?ŝƚ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĨƵů ƚŽ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ƌŝƐŬ ĂƐ ĂŶ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ Žn project 
performance rather than as a cause of an (uncertain) effect on project performance  ? 
Moreover they point out that: 
x uncertainty is related to  ?ƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ? which concerns of variability and ambiguity; 
x ǀĂƌŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽ “ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐůŝŬĞĐŽƐƚ ?ĚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ?
x ambiguity is associated with  “lack of clarity because of the behaviour of relevant project players, 
lack of data, lack of detail, lack of structure to consider issues, working and framing assumptions 
being used to consider the issues, known and unknown sources of bias, and ignorance about how 
much effort it is worth expending to cůĂƌŝĨǇƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
This paper discusses risks and corresponding causes, as several uncertainties affect the Net Present 
Value (NPV) of ESS during their life cycle. Then it uses the ROA to manage the variability of the 
uncertainties.  
Investors look for investments with the highest return at the lowest possible risk, so a risks  ? 
taxonomy is extremely important. As in Blythe and House [21], risks are here classified as: 
1) techno-economic risks, that are related to the specific technology;  
2) market risks, that are the factors that affect the electricity supply system;  
3) regulation and policy risks. 
Tab 1 classifies the most relevant external and internal investment risks in ESS, and their respective 
causes: external risks are related to market and policies concerns, while internal risks are the 
technology-specific. Tab 2 highlights the causes of the risks with the highest impact and highest 
probability to occur. In summary: 
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1) one of the major external risk for the NPV of ESS is the high unpredictability and volatility of 
electricity prices, mainly caused by the increase of renewable power plants, and wind farms in 
particular. 
2) the introduction of incentives or the publication of long-term and stable energy policies 
specifically designed for ESS would have a major impact on the NPV of the ESS. For instance, the 
increase of intermittent renewables intensify the volatility of electricity prices during the peaks. 
Therefore, the increase of intermittent renewables is twofold: it favours the absolute revenues 
but it may decrease their relative value for power installed due to the higher price volatility. In 
order to overcome to this trade-off, fixed tariffs per kWh sold specifically designed for ESS would 
be valuable to guarantee ESS profitability.  
3) natural gas has a relevant impact on the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a CAES, as 85-90% of the 
Variable Operative Costs (VOC), besides the purchase of electricity, are fuel costs, and VOC have 
an impact on the LCC in a range of 36%-42%, as shown in section 4; 
4) the main internal risks affecting profitability of PHS and CAES are the delays in the construction 
and cost overrun. Both might have a very high impact on the profitability and high probability to 
occur. Moreover, any delay in the construction affects the profitability in two ways: firstly as a 
direct cause of cost overrun and secondly delaying the positive cash flow. 
5) variations of the electricity price mean value do not significantly affect the investment appraisal, 
as price arbitrage  leverages the difference between the highest and the lowest electricity prices.  
EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞĂĨŽƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƌŝƐŬƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
societal benefits that ESS provide [17]. 
  
High Impact 
INCREASE OF NATURAL GAS PRICE 
 
(ONLY for CAES) 
VARIATION OF THE ELECTRICITY PRICE SPREAD 
UNCERTAIN LEVEL OF INCENTIVES 
 
DELAYS IN THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE 
 
COST OVERRUN 
Low Impact VARIATION OF THE ELECTRICITY MEAN VALUE DECREASE OF THE ELECTRICITY PRICE VOLATILITY 
 Low probability High Probability 
Tab 1. Internal and External Risks of PHS and CAES operating Price Arbitrage and STOR 
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Main risks Causes Technologies analysed 
VARIATION OF THE 
ELECTRICITY PRICE SPREAD 
 
Installation of Photovoltaic increases PHS, AACAES, H2 and CH4 [22], ESS [23] 
Installation of Natural Gas Plant increases PHS, AACAES, H2 and CH4 [22] 
Grid interconnection increase ESS [24] [25] 
Efficiency in control reserve increases PHS, AACAES, H2 and CH4 [22]. 
Demand response, energy efficiency, distributed 
generation increase ESS [25] [26] 
Electricity demand decreases, no need of new 
capacity to be installed ESS [23]. 
Installation of ESS increases PHS, AACAES, H2 and CH4 [22], 
Phase out of nuclear power plants PHS, AACAES, H2 and CH4 [10], [22] 
CO2 Price changes PHS, AACAES, H2 and CH4 [22], PHS and CAES [27], ESS [23]. 
Installation of Wind farm increases PHS, AACAES, H2 and CH4 [22], ESS [23] 
UNCERTAIN LEVEL OF 
INCENTIVES 
Institutional inertia and complexity in the 
elaboration of an efficient regulatory plan for ESS PHS and CAES [27], ESS [23] [28], [29]. 
DELAYS IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION PHASE 
Lengthening of the planning phase and/or 
construction phase and maturity of the technology PHS [11] [30][12], CAES [11] [31] 
COST OVERRUN 
 
Environmental concerns PHS [12], [32]. [33] 
Limited Experience ESS [23] 
Construction risks Power plants [34], not specific of ESS 
Tab 2. Main External and Internal Risks of PHS and CAES operating Price Arbitrage and STOR & corresponding causes 
 
 
 ROA in the Power Industry 
2.3.1 General Overview  
In UK, the electricity market liberalization has increased the investment risk [35], and traditional 
techniques based on deterministic Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) for the appraisal of projects are not 
ĨƵůůǇĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƚŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƚŚĞĂƌŝƐĞŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?ƐĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ?
Conversely, ROA is a valuable set of tool to assess investments in uncertain context [36].  
Fernandes et al. [37] list studies applying ROA on energy sector from 1987 till 2011, where the focus 
was mainly on the oil&gas industry, power generation and policy studies. Lee [38]presents an 
overview of ROA applied to RET. Tab 10, in appendix, is a holistic review of ROA applied to the Power 
Industry, and shows the increasing interest in the application of ROA in the Power Industry.  
2.3.2 ROA applied to EES 
Only few papers apply ROA to evaluate investments in ESS. The most relevant are discussed in this 
section and in Tab 11 in the appendix. 
Kroniger and Madlener [39] evaluate the investment in a hydrogen storage system to store the 
excess of electricity produced by wind farms. The risks are assessed through Monte Carlo (MC) 
simulations ? ĂŶĚ ZK ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĂƐƐĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ Đhoice of the 
investment timing. Reuter, Fuss et al. [8] use the ROA for the investment appraisal of PHS connected 
to a wind farm in the German and Norwegian scenario. ROA takes into account the variability of the 
electricity price, the possibility to benefit from incentives, and the intermittency of wind power. 
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Results show that the electricity premium price to trigger the investment of the PHS is very high 
(70% for Germany and 75% for Norway), and that the subsidy that would make up the difference 
between this needed premium and a more realistic premium is 35% for Germany and 50% for 
Norway. Muche [40] applies the ROA to the investment appraisal of PHS in Germany. Compared to 
ƚŚĞ ZK ? ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐƚŝĐ EWs ƵŶĚĞƌǀĂůƵĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
uncertainty and the flexibility associated the investment. 
 
2.3.3 Conclus ions  about  ROA 
In conclusion, the current review shows that: 
1) there is an increasing interest in the application of ROA in the power industry, as the ROA 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐĂŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
2) the ROA can be applied at different stages of a project; 
3) the ROA can evaluate the uncertainties such as the variability of electricity price, possible 
changes in regulations, potential increase of the natural gas price, and unexpected increase in 
capital costs; 
4) ROA can help to assess the risks related to investments in RET and ESS, that are affected by 
variability of their sources and uncertainties related to the regulatory environment. 
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3 Model  
Traditional methods for projectƐ ? financial evaluation are based on the DCF analysis, where cash 
flows are discounted to the current value and the NPV is the sum of the sum of the DCF over the 
project as in   Eq 1, where WACC stands for Weighted Average Cost of Capital: 
 ࡺࡼࢂ ൌ ࢳ࢚ୀ૙ࢀ ࡯ࡲ࢚ሺ૚ାࢃ࡭࡯࡯ሻ࢚ Eq 1 
 
A common investment rule is to proceed if the NPV is greater than zero or, in case of a choice 
between two or more projects of comparable size, the priority will be given to the one with the 
higher NPV [41]. DCF analysis is easy to implement, but has some flaws [42], that can be reduced 
using different techniques, such as the sensitivity analysis or the scenario analysis. However , these 
two techniques are deterministic, as they do not consider the stochastic nature of the parameters 
that affect the analysis.  
A more powerful tool is the MC simulation, in which the values of the independent variables x are 
extracted from their assumed stochastic processes, generating the approximated probability 
distributions of the dependent variables F(x). For every simulation, a defined number of paths is 
generated, sampling the values of the stochastic variables, to create the NPV distribution. These NPV 
distributions are characterizeĚ ďǇ Ă ŵĞĂŶ ǀĂůƵĞ ʅ ?EWs )  ?ĂůƐŽ ĐĂůůĞĚ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ǀĂůƵĞ  ?EWs ? ) ? Ă
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶʍ ?EWs ) ?ĂŶĚŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ supporting the investors in their decisions. 
As in Locatelli et.al [43], the current analysis implements the MC simulation to model the stochastic 
nature of the main risks concerning ESS.  
In order to model the ROA, four sequential steps are considered, as explained in the following 
sections, as shown in Fig 1. 
The ROA considers calculates the value of three real options: 
1) the option to wait to invest; 
2) the option to build; 
3) the option to wait to build. 
The first option considers the ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ
screening, but to wait that some relevant parameters (i.e. capital costs) decrease to a certain value 
ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĚĞĐŝĚĞ
whether to build or not after the detailed design phase. The third option models ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?
option to further postpone the decision to build the ESS system, waiting for a further capital costs 
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reduction. Fig 2 shows the logical flow chart to develop the ROA analysis. The parameter called CC* 
in Fig 2 is the capital costs value that triggers the investment, as explained in step 3. 
 
 
Fig 1. The four-steps model and the three real options implemented 
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Fig 2. Logical flow chart  
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 Inputs 
The inputs of the four steps are summarized in Tab 3 and they are classified into Historical data (H), 
Deterministic data (D) and Stochastic ones (S). Tab 4 lists the technical data for PHS and CAES 
systems. STOR revenues are added to the average yearly revenues from price arbitrage, as the UK 
National Grid allows the utility to provide different services, as long as price arbitrage operations do 
not interfere with the provision of STOR [44]. Stochastic inputs are evaluated in Step 3 and Step 4. 
 
Input Value 1 2 3 4 Source 
Hourly electricity prices [£/MWh] 
N2EX Day Ahead 
Auction Prices 
H 
   
[45] 
Revenues from Price Arbitrage CAES [£/MW] 15,656 £/MW 
 
D S S 
Average Revenues 
2010-2014 [45] 
 
Revenues from Price Arbitrage PHS [£/MW] 32,758 £/MW 
 
D S S 
Average Revenues 
2010-2014 [45] 
Storage Capacity installed CAES [hours] 4 h 
 
D D D Output of Step 1 
Storage Capacity installed PHS [hours] 6 h 
 
D D D Output of Step 1 
STOR average availability payments [£/MWh] 2.45 £/MWh 
 
H H H [46] 
STOR average utilization payments [£/MWh]  155 £/MWh 
 
H H H [46] 
STOR average availability hours [hours]  3,864 h 
 
H S S [46] 
STOR average utilization hours [hours] 78 h 
 
H S S [46] 
Capital Costs [£/MW] Tab 4 
 
D S S [47] 
Fixed Operating Costs [£/MWh] Tab 4 
 
D D D [47] 
Variable Operating Costs [£/MWh] Tab 4 D D D D [47] 
Round Trip Efficiency_PHS [ܹ݄݇௢௨௧Ȁܹ݄݇௜௡] 0,8  H H H [11], [13] 
Energy Ratio_CAESሾܹ݄݇௜௡Ȁܹ݄݇௢௨௧] 0,75  H H H [11], [13] 
Heat Rate_CAES [kj_fuel/kWh_out] 1,17  H H H [48] 
Planning time [years] 3 
 
H H H [19] [47] [33] 
Construction time [years] 3; 4; 5; 
 
H H H [19] [47] [33] 
Service life [years] 40 years 
 
H H H [47] 
Natural Gas Price [£/MWh] 22.17 £/MWh 
 
H S S [49] 
WACC [%] 5%; 7.5%; 10%; 
 
D D D [50] [51] 
Conversion Rate (£/$) 0,65 £/$ H H H H [52] 
Incentives [£/kWh] 0; 10; 25; 40; 55 
  
D D Output of Step 2 
Capital Costs Threshold [£/MW] Tab 8 
   
D Output of Step 3 
Tab 3. Inputs of the four Steps: H = Historical data, D = Deterministic data, S = Stochastic data 
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ESS 
CAES PHS 
50 MW 236 MW 322 MW 441 MW 280 MW 1300 MW 
Installed Capacity [MW] 50 236 322 441 280 1,300 
Power Costs [$/kW] 1,078 867 636 524 1,550 1,550 
Energy Costs [£/kWh] 17 16 17 17 156 103 
Fixed O&M Costs [$/kW] 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 13.81 11.2 
Variable O&M Costs [$/kWh] 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.00029 0.003 
Tab 4. Technical data of CAES and PHS [47] 
 The four steps model 
Step 1  W Optimal Storage Capacity to operate Price Arbitrage and STOR  
The first step of this work relies on the same hypothesis and method detailed in [3] and calculates 
the optimal size capacity of the storage reservoir of the PHS and the CAES system analysed.  
 
Step 2  W DCF analysis 
The second step is the deterministic DCF analysis over the plant lifecycle. The DCF analysis provides: 
1) the investment NPV, IRR and PBT; 
2) the ratios between capital costs or operating costs considering the entire LCC. These ratios are 
particularly relevant for the CAES system, in order to assess the impact of Natural Gas Cost on 
the LCC. The ratio between VOC and LCC for a CAES lays in the range 36%-43%; 
3) the required incentives to guarantee NPV = 0 for PHS and CAES operating price arbitrage and 
STOR, that for a CAES lays in the range 34 £/MWh  W 47 £/MWh, while for a PHS they are 22 
£/MWh  W 25£/MWh. 
 
Step 3  W Option to wait to invest  
The NPV calculated in step 2 uses as deterministic inputs: 
1) the expected values of capital costs [£/MW]; 
2) the current value of natural gas cost [£/MWh]; 
3) the current values of the electricity price [£/MWh]. 
Since the capital costs overrun is the most relevant risk jeopardizing the investment in ESS, it is 
fundamental to assess its impact. Step 3 evaluates the expected capital costs threshold CC* that 
triggers the investment in ESS. CC* is the threshold that guarantees the maximum E[NPV], taking 
into account the probability to reach such value. Capital costs equal to zero would surely guarantee 
the maximum NPV, but there is a probability equal to zero that this could happen. So step 3 
considers the trade-off of a costs reduction (and increment) in combination with the probability that 
it will occur.  
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Step 3 starts with the DCF analysis, where the major risks that affect investments in PHS and CAES 
presented previously are modelled as explained in Tab 5. The impact of all the stochastic inputs is 
taken into account in the DCF - MC simulation. Step 3 deals with five scenarios with different levels 
of incentives per MWh of electricity sold (0, 10, 25, 40 and 55 £/MWh) because: 
1) even if there are no incentives dedicated to ESS at the moment, incentives for ESS are a debated 
topic [27], [50]; 
2) the level of incentives introduced is uncertain;  
3) the E[NPV] without incentives would be so low that the ROA would add only a very little value to 
the analysis, and there would be no capital costs threshold CC* that would trigger the 
investment. 
 
Major risks Impact Evaluation tool Ref 
Electricity Price Spread 
increases/decreases 
Price Arbitrage revenues 
increase/decrease 
Geometric Brownian Motion [39], [53] W[55] 
Volatility increases/decreases 
STOR revenues 
increase/decrease 
ɴ-Pert distribution [30], [43], [51], 
[56] W[58] 
Incentives are allocated Revenues increase Scenario analysis [41] 
Natural Gas costs 
increases/decreases 
CAES VOC increases/decreases Geometric Brownian Motion [53], [54], [59] W[62] 
Cost Overrun occurs: Capital 
Costs increase/decrease 
Expected Costs 
increase/decrease 
ɴ-Pert distribution [30], [43], [51], 
[56] W[58] 
Tab 5. Tools used to model the major risks that affect PHS and CAES 
 
Being the capital costs overrun the most risky parameter ? ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ŽŶ ŝƚ ? dŚĞ ɴ-Pert 
distribution is suitable to model uncertainties related to capital costs, as it emphasizes the "most 
likely" value, which in this model is equal to the expected capital costs, as well as the lower and the 
upper limits ?dŚĞɴ-Pert distribution related to the concept screening phase has a lower value of 0.5 
and an upper value of 2 to emphasize the high uncertainty related to capital costs during this phase 
[58] ? dŚĞɴ-Pert distribution related to the detailed design phase has a lower value of 0.9 and an 
upper value of 1.6 to highlight the fact that, after the detailed design, the uncertainties about capital 
costs have reduced, but there is still the possibility that costs will rise significantly [58].  
Fig 3 represents the NPV distribution of the concept screening phase of a CAES system with a rated 
capacity of 50 MW, 40 £/MWh of incentives and WACC = 7.5%, that corresponds to a scenario of 
high capital costs uncertainty [58]. The mean of the NPV distribution is slightly positive, so the 
standard DCF approach would suggest to invest. However, implementing the option to wait to 
invest, it is possible to take a more careful decision, as the decision to invest will be exercised only in 
some scenarios, i.e. when the value of the capital costs is lower than the capital cost threshold CC*. 
These scenarios are represented through iterations of the MC simulation. 
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Fig 3. Stochastic NPV distribution CAES 50 MW, 40£/MWh of incentives, WACC=7.5% 
 
Fig 4 shows the impact of capital costs on the E[NPV] and it refers to the 50 MW CAES with 40 
£/MWh of incentives and WACC = 7.5%. In summary: 
1) the E[NPV] corresponding to very low capital costs (in the region of 400  W 600 k£/MW) is close to 
zero, because the probability to reach so low capital costs is negligible; 
2) the E[NPV] corresponding to very high capital costs is equal to the NPV without considering the 
threshold CC*, i.e. where the investment is triggered 100% of times (E[NPV]>0). Regarding the 
50 MW CAES system, E[NPV] = 6.846 k£/MW; 
3) between these two extremes, the E[NPV] has a maximum value: the capital costs that 
correspond to the maximum expected NPV is the capital cost threshold CC*. In ROA, the 
maximum E[NPV] is called expanded NPV [53]. Regarding the 50 MW CAES system the expanded 
NPV is 39.330 k£/MW; 
4) At P the NPV is equal to the NPV without considering the threshold  CC*. For capital costs lower 
than P, the E[NPV] is lower than the one found with the MC simulation of the concept screening 
phase. Regarding the CAES system of Fig 4, P corresponds to capital costs equal to 505.196 
k£/MW. 
5) ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞʍ ?EWs ?ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂůĐŽƐƚƐ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĞŶĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ
with the E[NPV] of Fig 4, in Fig 5.  
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Fig 4. Impact of Capital Costs on the E[NPV] 
 
Fig 5. E [NPV] combined with ʍ ?EWs ? 
 
Fig 5 shows that: 
1) investing now is less profitable and more risky than wait for the capital cost threshold CC*, that 
optimizes the mean of the NPV distribution; 
2) the distribution obtained from waiting the threshold CC* has the highest E[NPV]. NPV 
distributions with capital costs lower than CC* have lower standard deviation, but also their 
E[NPV] is lower; 
3) the Pareto front is defined as a set of non-dominated solutions, so all the points corresponding 
to capital costs from 0 to CC* are on a Pareto front. Indeed, each point of the Pareto front in Fig 
5 does not have a corresponding point with both higher E[NPV] and lower standard deviation.  
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4) there is an optimal capital costs range in which is convenient to invest. This range lays between 
P and CC*: between these two values the investment reaches the highest NPV, and the utility 
can decide to invest, according to its risk aversion. For the CAES system of 50 MW displayed 
above, the range of capital costs lies between capital costs equal to P = 505,196 £/MW and 
capital costs equal to the threshold CC* = 828,511 £/MW.  
The results of this study also indicate that not every scenario presents capital cost threshold CC*. In 
some scenarios the NPV is already so high that it is useless to wait for a reduction of capital costs; in 
other scenarios the NPV is so low that even a dramatic reduction in capital costs would not cause a 
positive NPV. For instance, a PHS system with a rated power of 280 MW, in a scenario with 40 
£/MWh of incentives and a WACC of 7.5 % has an E[NPV] of the concept screening phase equal to 
582,573 £/MW. In this case there is no need to wait for a reduction of the capital costs, as the 
investment would be profitable anyway. As shown in Fig 6, the curve reductions with the reduction 
of capital costs, because the probability that capital costs decrease substantially is low, which has a 
negative impact on the E[NPV].  
Conversely, a CAES system with a rated power of 50 MW, in a scenario with 25 £/MWh of incentives 
ĂŶĚ Ă t ŽĨ  ? ? ? A? ŚĂƐ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ůŽǁ EWs ? ĂŶĚ ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ Ă ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĐŽƐƚƐ ? ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ
pointless. As shown in Fig 6, the expected NPV is equal to -164,992 £/MW, and even if capital costs 
ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇ ?ƚŚĞEWsƌĞŵĂŝŶƐA? ? ?Even with a cost of capital equal to zero the operation 
cost would be greater than revenue, with a net loss every year. Fig 6 shows consistency with the 
literature about ROA: if the NPV is very high or very low, ROA is useless. For this reasons, step 4 
focuses only on the scenarios where the assessment of the value of uncertainties of capital costs is 
relevant, i.e. where there is a capital cost threshold CC*.  
 
 
Fig 6. Impact of capital costs on E[NPV]  
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Step 4  W Option to build & Option to wait to build 
ZK ?ƐŵĂŝŶĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ŝƐƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ [36]. The algorithm of Fig 7 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?ƐŽƉƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞƚŽďƵŝůĚŽƌŶŽƚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĚĞƐŝŐŶ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ?
after the uncertainties related to capital costs have reduced). The detailed design allows the 
execution of the project to proceed without major changes [63]. After the detailed design phase, the 
ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵĂƐƐŝŐŶƐĂŶĞǁɴ-Pert distribution to the capital costs, with lower and upper limit closer to 
the capital ĐŽƐƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚǀĂůƵĞ ?ƚŽŵŽĚĞůƚŚĞƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůĐŽƐƚƐ ?ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? 
The NPV distribution of the MC simulation with low uncertainties records the number of times that 
the detailed design has not been done (that corresponds to null NPV), and the number of times 
where the project was abandoned after the concept screening, as shown in Fig 8. This analysis 
causes a remarkable increase in the E[NPV] as the project has been aborted several times before the 
detailed design phase, as the peak in Fig 8 shows. 
 
Fig 7. Algorithm of Step 4 
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Fig 8 ?ZK ?ƐEWsĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ^ ? ?Dt, 40£/MWh of incentives, WACC=7.5%  
Compared to the stochastic DCF analysis, ROA captures (1) the added value that investors gain from 
the option to wait for a reduction in capital costs, and (2) the added value of postponing the decision 
to build or not the ESS after the detailed design. The option to wait to invest (step 3) causes a 
remarkable increase in the E[NPV], and in some scenarios it even causes an adjustment of the NPV 
from negative to positive. The option to build after the detailed design further increases the E[NPV] 
and lowers the number of times that negative NPV occurs.  
For example, regarding the CAES system with a rated capacity of 50 MW, 40 £/MWh of incentives 
and WACC = 7.5% of Fig 3 and Fig 8: 
1) the results of the stochastic DCF analysis are: 
- E[NPV] = 6,846 £/MW 
- probability of negative P(NPV<0) = 46.07 % 
2) the option to wait that the capital cost threshold CC* is reached provides: 
- E[NPV] = 39,339 £/MW 
- probability of negative P(NPV<0) = 11.26 % 
3) as shown in Fig 8, the option to invest in the detailed design and to postpone the decision to 
build causes:  
-  E[NPV] = 42,961 £/MW 
- probability of negative P(NPV>0) = 10.4 %  
Step 4 models ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ detailed design, has to decide whether to 
build or not. However, investors might find convenient to postpone the decision and to wait for a 
further reduction of the capital costs caused by external exogenous factors. Indeed, factors such as 
technology breakthrough, mass production, industrial learning or currency issues, can have a 
ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞ^^ ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŽŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵ ? 
To mathematically model the additional flexibility of the option to wait to build, a reduction of 
capital costs has been simulated through a reduction ŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐɴ-Pert 
distribution. Results are presented in section 4.  
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4 Results 
Results of Step 1  
The optimal storage capacity for PHS systems and CAES systems is respectively 6 hours and 4 hours, 
that shows consistency with Ref [3]. Due to the market conditions a bigger storage capacity would 
be detrimental, as the cost to build it would be higher than the revenues provided by a bigger 
reservoir. The results regarding the optimization of the size of the reservoir are consistent with the 
literature, i.e. with the analysis that deal with the same ESS in the UK market [3] and with the 
analysis that deal with other countries (i.e. Germany and Norway in [8]). In both cases results are 
comparable. 
Results of Step 2 
The DCF analysis of step 2 provides several outputs. Tab 6 lists the deterministic NPV of the ESS 
systems of the different scenarios under evaluation and it highlights in italics the scenarios with very 
high NPV (blue cells), or very low NPV (white cells). dŚĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐĂƌĞĐĂůůĞĚ “veƌǇŚŝŐŚ ?Žƌ “ǀĞƌǇůŽǁ ?
because it is irrelevant to proceed with step 3 and step 4, as the ROA would not generate additional 
value. The investment is profitable or unprofitable regardless the modelled uncertainties.  In bold are 
highlighted the scenarios where the ROA generates relevant additional value (purple cells), and the 
assessment of the value of uncertainties can change the investment decision from not investing 
(E[NPV] <0) to investing (E[NPV]>0). 
Incentives WACC 
CAES PHS 
50 MW 236 MW 322 MW 441 MW 280 MW 1300 MW 
0 £/MWh 
5% -475 -429 -36 -322 -82 -103 
7.50% -421 -372 -302 -269 -264 -269 
10% -384 -334 -268 -234 -363 -356 
10 £/MWh 
5% -308 -269 -195 -170 246 210 
7.50% -306 -266 -195 -170 -39 -61 
10% -301 -259 -192 -170 -201 -208 
25 £/MWh 
5% -56 -30 44 58 738 678 
7.50% -134 -106 -36 -21 297 252 
10% -177 -146 -79 -62 43 14 
40 £/MWh 
5% 195 210 283 286 1,230 1,146 
7.50% 37 54 1240 128 633 565 
10% -52 -33 34 40 287, 235 
55 £/MWh 
5% 446 449 523 514 1,722 1,615 
7.50% 209 214 284 277 970, 879 
10% 72 81 148 143 531 457 
Tab 6. Deterministic NPV [k£/MW] with different level of incentives  
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A remarkable finding from Tab 6, is that in the scenarios with 10 £/MWh of incentives a very small 
variation of the WACC causes remarkable changes in the E[NPV] of the PHS system analysed, that 
varies form a very high value (NPV > 200,000 £/MW) to a very low value (NPV < -200,000 £/MW). 
This is because the capital costs of PHS systems are more than 85% of the LCC, and even a small 
variation of WACC has a large impact on their E[NPV]. Indeed, compared to the capital costs of CAES 
systems, the capital costs of PHS system are more than double. This result highlights the relevance of 
the WACC since a variation of only 2.5% provokes a significant change in the investment appraisal 
and in the adequacy of the ROA. ROA does not provide any additional value when WACC is equal to 
5% or 10%, as the correspondent NPV is either already very high or very low. 
As shown in Tab 7 ?^ ?ƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐƚŝĐEWsŝƐůŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶW,^ ?ƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐƚŝĐEWs ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƵƐĞƐĂ
higher incentives. In particular the CAES systems analysed require incentives that lays between 34.4 
£/MWh and 46.4 £/MWh, while PHS systems need incentives that vary from 22.4 £/MWh and 24.8 
£/MWh. These results are consistent with [8], and slightly differ from the conclusion of [3], due to 
changes in the UK market conditions [46]. In accordance to the results of Tab 7, it is useful to analyse 
five scenarios with different level of incentives for each MWh of electricity sold: 0, 10, 25, 40 and 55 
£/MWh. 
ESS 
CAES PHS 
50 MW 236 MW 322 MW 441 MW 280 MW 1300 MW 
Capital Costs/LCC 43% 42 % 35% 34% 89% 87% 
FOC/LCC 21% 21% 24% 24% 11% 8% 
VOC/LCC 36% 37% 42% 42% 1% 5% 
Incentives [£/MWh] 46.4 44.8 36.0 34.4 22.4 24.8 
Tab 7. Capital Costs and Operating Costs compared to LCC and incentive that guarantee NPV=0 
Results of Step 3 
Results of step 3 consist of:  
1) the NPV distributions of the concept screening phase; 
2) the capital costs thresholds CC*. 
The NPV distributions of step 3 are particularly relevant when compared with the ones of step 4. 
Therefore the ŵĂŝŶƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ? ?EWs ? ?ʍ ?EWs ? and the probability of having negative NPV) of the 
aforementioned distributions are listed in the following paragraph as a comparison with the results 
of step 4.  
Tab 8 lists the capital cost threshold CC* of the scenarios where NPV is neither very high nor very 
low. The scenarios with NPV >> 0 or NPV << 0 are not further analysed, as there are no capital cost 
threshold CC*. The comparison between the values of CC* of Tab 8 and the current expected capital 
costs is also relevant, as (1) in some scenarios, the expected capital costs are close to the capital cost 
22 
 
thresholds CC*, and (2) in some others the expected capital costs are already lower than the 
threshold CC*, as the distributions assigned to the capital costs have a negative skew. 
Incentives WACC 
CAES PHS 
50 MW 236 MW 322 MW 441 MW 280 MW 1300 MW 
0 £/MWh 
5.0% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 1,451 1,222 
7.5% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 
10.0% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 
10£/MWh 
5.0% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
7.5% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 1,550 1,309 
10.0% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 
25 £/MWh  
5% 632 525 537 487 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
7.5% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 369 334 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
10% NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 NPV<<0 1,748 1,438 
40 £/MWh 
5% NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
7.5% 829 710 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
10% 623 525 537 463 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
55 £/MWh 
5% NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
7.5% NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
10% 920 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 NPV>>0 
Tab 8. Capital Costs Thresholds CC* [k£/MW] 
Results of Step 4 
The algorithm presented in Fig 7 provides the following outputs: 
1) how many times the investment in the detailed design is done, i.e. the times that the capital cost 
was lower than the threshold CC*; 
2) how many times the deterministic NPV is lower than zero and the project does not proceed after 
the detailed design phase; 
3) how many times the deterministic NPV is higher than zero and the analysis proceeds with the 
MC simulation with low uncertainty; 
4) the NPV distribution after the implementation of the option to build.  
 
The results of step 4 are presented in Tab 9 highlighting the comparison between the main 
parameters of the NPV distribution regarding: 
1) the stochastic DCF analysis in the concept screening phase; 
2) the scenario with capital costs equal to CC*, i.e. the implementation of the option to wait to 
invest; 
3) the implementation of the option to build after the detailed design phase; 
4) the implementation of the option to wait to build after the detailed design phase. 
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ESS 
In
ce
n
ti
v
e
s 
W
A
C
C
 
Concept screening 
phase:  
Stochastic DCF 
analysis 
NPV distributions 
corresponding to 
the capital cost 
threshold CC* 
Detailed Design 
Phase:  
Option to build 
Detailed Design 
Phase:  
Option to wait to 
build 
E[NPV] NPV<0 E[NPV] NPV<0 E[NPV] NPV<0 E[NPV] NPV<0 
£/MWh % £/MW % £/MW % £/MW % £/MW % 
PHS 280 MW 0
 
5
 
-127,662 74.69% 14,937 5.83% 17,324 5.05% 19,891 4.31% 
PHS 1300 MW 0
 
5
 
-145,597 77.43% 10,427 5.69% 13,671 5.00% 13,416 4.74% 
PHS 280 MW 10
 
7.5
 
-90,486 70.15% 21,943 6.30% 27,075 5.78% 30,754 3.13% 
PHS 1300 MW 10
 
7.5
 
-107,878 73.71% 16,895 6.43% 21,175 5.24% 22,395 3.89% 
CAES 50 MW 25 5 -90,753 72.56% 5,878 5.57% 6,184 7.96% 7,518 7.44% 
CAES 236 MW 25 5 -60,958 65.28% 9,158 7.86% 10,637 9.20% 10,743 7.38% 
CAES 322 MW 25 5 19,114 42.01% 35,058 20.24% 38,189 19.33% 40,819 18.44% 
CAES 441 MW 25 5 34,795 37.14% 43,102 22.61% 46,567 22.23% 48,582 21.10% 
CAES 322 MW 25 7.5 -56,857 73.00% 3,235 6.73% 3,670 4.98% 3,910 4.68% 
CAES 441 MW 25 7.5 -39,858 67.85% 4,772 7.54% 5,362 7.34% 5,658 7.13% 
PHS 280 MW 25
 
10
 
-9,381 50.88% 51,766 6.25% 59,719 7.28% 71,264 0.84% 
PHS 1300 MW 25
 
10
 
-34,790 57.18% 39,396 4.04% 45,160 5.50% 49,792 1.01% 
CAES 50 MW 40 7.5 6,846 46.04% 39,330 11.26% 42,961 10.40% 48,270 8.19% 
CAES 236 MW 40 7.5 26,781 38.52% 46,346 11.87% 50,718 11.42% 53,994 9.35% 
CAES 50 MW 40 10 -80,504 78.80% 6,040 5.05% 7,212 4.74% 7,905 3.85% 
CAES 236 MW 40 10 -57,405 73.78% 7,318 5.60% 8,460 5.47% 8,999 4.49% 
CAES 322 MW 40 10 15,300 40.07% 30,480 10.24% 33,520 11.40% 36,453 8.88% 
CAES 441 MW 40 10 23,705 34.18% 32,822 13.35% 35,727 11.37% 24,951 1.38% 
CAES 50 MW 55 10 44,030 31.84% 61,258 7,95% 66,899 7.79% 74,575 3.51% 
Tab 9. Summary of the results 
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5 Conclusions  
The increasing amount of variable power production from RET is becoming a key challenge for the 
management of the electrical grid. ESS are one of the most promising solutions to provide the 
flexibility required for future smart grids, as they can store energy and deliver it on demand. In 
particular, the most suitable ESS for the storage of several MWh are PHS and CAES. Being 
investments in these technologies intrinsically risky a careful appraisal is envisaged. The risks that 
mainly affect the profitability of PHS and CAES systems are (1) the reduction of the electricity price 
spread and its volatility, (2) the increase of natural gas prices, (3) the value of incentives, (4) delays in 
construction and (5) costs overrun. Within these, costs overrun is the major challenge, as the capital 
costs of PHS weights 87%-89% of its LCC and the capital costs of CAES weights 33% - 43% of its LCC. 
This paper proposes and applies an innovative method, based on the ROA, ƚŽ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ^^ ?
investment profitability and support the decision maker strategy. Its key contribution is the 
ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ ƋƵĂŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ƌŝƐŬƐ ĂŶĚ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ -making process, 
through the implementation of three options. The first option appraises the value of waiting for a 
reduction of the capital costs; the second option calculates the value of postponing the decision of 
building the ESS after the detailed design; the third option assesses the value of waiting to build 
after the detailed design. The model is congruent with the ROA theory, as it shows that, in the 
presence of investment uncertainty, the ROA can evaluate more positively the profitability of the 
project compared to what it is obtained with a classic DCF analysis.  
As shown in section 4, the implementation of the first option provides a remarkable increase of the 
E[NPV] and a reduction of the probability to incur in a negative NPV. In all the scenarios with 
negative E[NPV] the option to wait for a reduction of the capital costs till the threshold CC* causes 
the change from the negative E[NPV] to a positive E[NPV]. Similarly to the first option, the 
implementation of the second option further increases the E[NPV] and reduces the probability to 
incur in a negative NPV. Conversely, the implementation of the third option shows that, unless a 
halving of the capital costs occurs, no additional value is provided from the decision of waiting to 
build after the detailed design.  
This paper paves the way to a number of further researches. Among them the most relevant are: 
1) To assess the profitability of other ESS technologies for different storage applications, such as 
providers of fast reserve or integrate nuclear power; 
2) To investigate other European and extra-European scenarios, assessing the relative risks to 
compare the results with the UK market; 
3) To implement other real options, e.g. investments in small-medium CAES or batteries can profit 
for the implementation of the option to expand; 
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4) To analyse economical and technical risks and benefits of building ESS from the point of view of 
the society; 
5) To model the grid behaviour, including transmission limits and failure in the generation units. 
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Appendix 
Scenario Focus of the ROA Assumptions & main simplification of the model Real Option Main achieved results 
-Location not specified 
-Small hydro power 
plant (500 kW) [35] 
-Volatility of electricity prices 
-Regulatory change: given the current economic crisis, 
the government believes that the support given to 
electricity generation from renewable sources is no 
longer a priority 
-No technology changes, no environmental policies, and no 
fuel costs are considered 
-No spot market prices are included as they may be strongly 
influenced by short-term factors.  
-Mini-hydro plant is not implemented in phases 
-Option to postpone the 
investment (also called 
option to defer) 
-The project value after ROA has higher NPV when compared with the NPV of the traditional 
DCF analysis. The option value is the difference between static NPV and expanded NPV, and it 
has a positive value. It is convenient for the investor to wait for more information in order to 
lower project uncertainty, and will invest when electricity price are sufficiently high 
-France 
-Small Modular 
Reactors 
[43] 
-Analysis of the economic viability of building an algae-
biofuel plant or a desalinisation plant coupled to an 
SMR  
-Numerical assumptions regarding technical data -Option to build 
-Option to switch 
-The main economic result is that the desalination plant can be a viable investment in several 
scenarios 
-The option to switch is able to add an extra worth to the investment project given by the 
operation flexibility. The advantage given by the possibility to switch between two alternative 
output products strongly depends on the combination of relative prices of water and electricity 
-UK market 
[64] 
-Domestic 
photovoltaic system 
-Improvement in efficiency and cost reduction in the 
photovoltaic (PV) modules increase the value of the 
option to defer the investment  
-Hypothesis of the domestic consumers do not apply to 
every analysis.  
-Simplified assumptions about the FITs can have significant 
impacts on economic attractivness on PV systems in UK.  
- The model employs a quadranomial lattice to address 
uncertainty in the life cycle cost of PV systems due to the 
greenhouse gas emissions trading market. 
-Option to postpone the 
investment 
-The results suggest that PV technologies can be introduced in the next 4 years if cost 
reductions and tradable permits value increases are realized. A relevant result is that delaying 
investment in a system designed with wafer-based multi-crystalline is not convenient, but 
delaying investment in a system with emerging organic-based thin film cells is highly 
convenient. 
-China 
[65] 
-Nuclear power 
-Fluctuations of input costs 
-Regulatory actions might cause a forced termination of 
the construction 
-The potential that a reactor may not be re-licensed is 
considered 
-Risk of mismanagement is considered 
-Not explicit: numerical assumptions regarding technical 
data 
-Option to abandon -The goal of this analysis is to assess the loss of value in a nuclear project, taken the listed risks 
ŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?KŶĐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?ƐŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌŵĂƌŬĞƚďĂƐĞĚĐůŝŵĂƚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ
are taken into account, it appears that new nuclear may be a viable investment at current rates 
of subsidy.  
-Germany 
[66] 
-Several renewables 
technologies 
-Price of electricity 
-Public incentives: feed-in tariffs, investment subsidies, 
tax credits, portfolio requirements, certificate systems 
-Impact of large companies on prices in the market & 
uncertainties emanating from market and environment  
-No alternative ideas to stabilize profits from renewable 
energy carriers, such as PHS, were explored 
-Option to invest into 
new power generation 
capacity and choose the 
most convenient type of 
technology 
-Environmental uncertainties such as the variability of renewable loads need to be modelled 
explicitly, due to their high impact 
-Feed-in tariff are an effective means of promoting renewable investment  
 
-Nordic region:  
[67] 
-Renewables, focus on 
wind farms 
-Price uncertainty 
-Public incentives: feed-in tariffs and renewable energy 
certificate trading. 
-Independence between production and price.  
-Annual production is a function of the capacity installed, 
and this function is increasing and concave 
-No depreciation on renewable investment. 
-No correlation between capital cost and steel spot prices 
and no correlation between electricity future price and 
subsidy payments. 
-Option to postpone the 
investment, under 
different support 
schemes.  
-Option to choose the 
plant scale 
-In the Nordic case study, feed-in tariff encourages earlier investment. Nevertheless, as in 
investment has been undertaken, renewable energy certificate trading create incentives for 
larger projects 
 
 
-Generic 
[68] 
-Hydro power 
-Price of electricity 
-Zd ?ƐƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ 
-Siting  
-Characteristic of the hydro power plant  
-Storage dimension 
-Option to wait  
-Option to wait and 
adjust design parameter  
-&ůĞǆŝďůĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƚŝŵŝŶŐĂŶĚĨůĞǆŝďůĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶƐŝƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐĂ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚĐĂůůĞĚ “ĚǀĂŶĐĞĚZK ? ?dŚŝƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚthrough an hydropower case study 
-Spanish market 
[69] 
-Wind power 
generation 
-Volatility, strength of reversion and long-term trend of 
the NPV are inserted into a trinomial investment option 
valuation tree. 
-The energy produced and the price of the electricity 
sold are the two stochastic processes analysed 
-Not explicit: technical data regarding the six case studies 
analysed 
-Option to invest now, to 
wait and or to abandon 
are considered 
-Aa real options model is built upon a trinomial tree that evaluates numerically the 
probabilities of the alternatives of investing now, waiting or abandoning the project Among 
other results, it is interesting to notice that the variation of the option price is found to be 
almost linear with respect to the risk aversion and that the volatility of the spot price does not 
affect results significantly 
-Taiwan 
[38] 
Wind technology 
Main option parameters are 
-Underlying price (estimated NRE costs) 
-Exercise price (estimated RE costs) 
-Time to maturity  
-Risk-free rate 
-Volatility (historic percentage of price movements) 
-The model incorporates internal factors as firm decision-
making actions and external factors such as oil price 
fluctuations and other changes in the investment 
environment 
-The reliability and accuracy of the data has to be reviewed, 
in order to further improving the proposed model.  
-Option to wait is 
considered in order to 
reduce uncertainty in 
policy planning  
-Analytical results indicate that ROA is a highly effective means of quantifying how investment 
planning and managerial flexibility influence RE development. This study shows the 
relationship between the value of developing RE and underlying price, exercise price, time to 
maturity, risk-free rate, and volatility 
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-Taiwan, 
2011 
[70] 
-Renewable 
technology, and wind 
farms  
-Fluctuation in the price of traditional fossil-fuel 
generated power is taken into account, as it affects RE. 
-Development in the policies are discussed 
-Not explicit: technical data regarding the case study of wind 
energy technology analysed 
-The government has the 
following five 
options: to grow, 
abandon, contract, 
expand, switch 
-The binomial RO pricing approach is adopted to explain the effect of fluctuations in the cost of 
fossil fuel-generated power. The model accounts for reductions in the cost of RE generation as 
well and it is used to draft development policies for the upcoming year. 
The proposed PET model can help reduce policy implementation costs, enhance policy 
performance, and facilitate an estimation of substantial benefits brought by specific policies 
-United States 
[71]  
-Oil & Gas 
-Oil price volatility: 
As the level of oil price uncertainty 
increases, the option value of waiting to invest 
increases and the incentive to invest declines. 
-These models assume risk neutrality, perfect competition, 
and constant returns to scale technology 
-Option to wait  
-Option to grow 
-Results provide a very strong evidence for a U shaped relationship between firm level 
investment and oil price volatility. Once the inflection point is reached, investment increases as 
the strategic growth option value dominates 
-Eastern Kentucky 
[72] 
 
-Oil & Gas, focus on 
gas production 
-Natural gas price -A deterministic model has been used. 
-Data of a specific well have been used.  
-A strategic model that starts at the pre-drilling phase could 
be considered in further researches.  
-Option to scale the 
production level 
-Option to scale the 
extraction rate by 
pausing the production 
 
-The use of ROA increases the value of the well. It is notable that the option value of the 
portfolio that includes all the three scaling options exceed the sum of the values of individual 
options 
-Option to produce, abandon, pause, invest/disinvest are also considered 
-China 
[73] 
Oil & Gas, overseas 
investment 
-Three major uncertainties: oil prices, investment 
environment and exchange rate. 
 
-First: the model has not considered the potential reward 
form the acquisition of future development options. Second, 
this research has assumed the oil price, exchange rate and 
investment environment to follow geometric Brownian 
motion which is a simplification. Third, the tax rate, interest 
rate and oil-production cost are 
constant in this model, and the impact of resource taxation 
on oil investment has not been considered 
-Option to abandon the 
project at an early stage. 
-It is a broad model that can be used by every oil investor  
country to value overseas oil resources. Using the model to evaluate the critical value per unit 
of oil reserves in different countries, it is possible to compare their oil investment 
risk by ranking their values of the Option Value Index.  
The investor can compare 
different countries' oil-investment risk by ranking their OVI to find which countries or areas are 
more proper to invest. 
-Europe and North 
America 
[74]  
-Oil & Gas: Liquefied 
Natural Gas 
-Natural Gas price volatility and convergence.  
-The effect of the variation of initial market prices for 
MC simulations, of mean reversion, of extra maritime 
transportation costs, of the number of alternative 
markets 
-Constant volatility and yearly average prices -Option to switch, i.e. to 
choose which 
international market is 
more convenient for the 
delivery of liquid natural 
gas. 
-The value of free destination is substantially reduced if we have high price convergence and 
low price volatility in the alternative market. Under these circumstances the parameters 
determining the price dynamics in the EU base market, mean reversion and price volatility in 
the base market, would gain importance in determining the value of free destination. 
 
-Norwegian context  
[75] 
-Hydropower plant  
-Volatility of electricity prices (that is linked to aspect 
like demand, international fuel prices, transmission 
constraints, climate, introduction of CO2 allowances..) 
-It is 
possible to construct a dynamic portfolio of assets 
-Option to invest  -The option value is calculated as a function of average forward price.  
Tab 10. Review of ROA applied to the Energy Sector 
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 This work G. Locatelli et al 2015 - [3] D. Kroniger and R. Madlener  2014 - [39] W. H. Reuter et al 2012 [8] T. Muche 2009 [40] 
Country Considered United Kingdom United Kingdom Germany Germany and Norway Germany 
Topic analyses 
Investment appraisal of ESS operating Price 
Arbitrage + STOR combined, adopting the 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?through the DCF 
analysis and the ROA. The DCF analysis 
includes the optimization of the Storage 
Reservoir. The ROA considers the degree of 
freedom of the investors. 
Investment appraisal of ESS 
operating Price Arbitrage and 
Price Arbitrage + STOR 
combined, adopting the 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ŽŶůǇ
through the DCF analysis. 
The DCF analysis includes the 
optimization of the Storage 
Reservoir. 
Investment appraisal of hydrogen storage for 
excess electricity produced with 
wind farms. 
Investment appraisal of a PHS connected 
to a wind farm vs. the wind farm alone 
Investment appraisal of a PHS plant 
Applications 
Electricity sold for Price Arbitrage + STOR 
combined 
Electricity sold for Price 
Arbitrage alone & electricity 
sold for Price Arbitrage + STOR 
combined 
Hydrogen produced for electricity storage 
purposes or produced and sold as a 
commodity 
Correlation between price arbitrage and 
the incentives required to have a 
profitable investment 
Electricity sold on the wholesale market 
and on reserve market 
ESS evaluated PHS and CAES PHS and CAES Hydrogen Storage PHS connected to a WPP PHS 
Method used 
DCF and ROA to 1) find the optimal storage 
capacity 2) find the incentives that 
guarantees NPV = 0 3) calculating the the 
capital cost threshold that would guarantee 
the maximum NPV and the value of the real 
option to wait to invest 4) calculating the 
value of the real option to build and to wait 
to build 
&ƚŽŵĂǆŝŵŝǌĞƚŚĞ^^ ?Ɛ
profit or the minimisation of 
the incentives 
ROA to maximize the profit of ESS 
ROA to maximize the expected profit 
during the planning period 
ROA to quantify the unit commitment 
planning that corresponds to future 
scope of actions. 
The difference between the contribution 
margins is the value of the future scope 
of actions. 
Real Options 
implemented 
Option to wait to invest; option to build; 
option to wait to build. 
none 
Option to switch between different strategies 
(not explicit); Option to wait (not explicit). 
Option to wait to invest (not explicit) 
Option to switch operation mode (not 
explicit) 
Results obtained 
from the investors 
perspective 
 
PHS and CAES are technologically suitable to 
balance renewables, but economically risky: 
currently investing is not recommended. 
ROA can help to evaluate risky investments 
as it evaluates more positively the 
profitability of the investment. However the 
development in the scenario has to be 
monitored, as results show that under 
specific conditions the investment in ESS 
would be profitable (NPV > 0). 
PHS and CAES are 
technologically suitable to 
balance renewables. However 
their NPV remains negative, 
unless specific incentives are 
introduced. The DCF model 
calculates the amount of 
incentives to have NPV = 0 
In the first scenario fuel cell cannot operate 
cost-effectively under the three operating 
modes considered, under current German 
market condition. 
The second scenario can offer only minute 
reserve, but avoiding the initial cost of fuel cell 
can cause a positive cash inflow, namely for 
hydrogen prices of more than 0. ? ? ? ?ଷ. ROA 
recommends this solution as the project value 
is twice the investment cost of the ESS. 
The necessary price premium so that the 
investment in ESS is profitable and the 
necessary subsidy to reach a more 
realistic price premium. In particular the 
premium price that triggers the 
investment of a ESS is 70% for Germany 
and 75% for Norway, and that the 
subsidy that should make up the 
difference between this needed 
premium and a more realistic premium, 
in the range 10% - 30%, reaches 35% for 
Germany and 50% for Norway. 
The comparison between the Real 
Option values and the traditional NPV 
approach shows that the traditional NPV 
has lower contribution margins that 
would lead to misevaluation of the 
investment. 
 
Further development 
recommended 
and/or main 
hypothesis adopted 
that suggest further 
development 
Modelling the grid behaviour  including 
transmission limits and failure in the 
generation units  
Modelling the investors 
behaviour to offset the 
investors risks that consider an 
investment in ESS 
The hydrogen price is limited; Reserve capacity 
market development might have an impact on 
the analysis; 
Cost of technical progress are neglected, only 
a rise in efficiency is taken into account.  
Further research should also try and 
include factors that have 
not been considered explicitly in this 
analysis: grids, economies of 
scale and  W in the case of Norway  W the 
planned green certificate 
system. 
Reserve market is not considered;. day-
ahead market serves as a forecasting 
basis for the intra-day market; Power 
output is fully and immediately available; 
No power networks constraints; Water 
usage is not constraint to any other 
usage. 
Tab 11. Benchmarking table with the literature concerning ROA and ESS
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